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ECONOMETRICS OF FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS: A SURVEY OF THE 
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED LITERATURE 
 
FLORENCIA GABRIELLI 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Analizar mercados de subastas comprende un área activa de investigación, tanto en el 
plano teórico como empírico. Este trabajo contiene una revisión de la literatura 
relevante para realizar econometría de subastas desde la perspectiva del enfoque 
estructural. El enfoque estructural es un marco para analizar datos de subastas en el 
cual la teoría y la econometría están estrechamente vinculadas. Hay tres aspectos 
fundamentales para el enfoque estructural: (i) Existen restricciones testeables 
impuestas desde el modelo teórico sobre los datos? (ii) Es posible identificar a los 
elementos estructurales que caracterizan una subasta sin tener que recurrir a 
información paramétrica a priori? (iii) Que puede decirse sobre procedimientos 
implementables de estimación que no se basen en supuestos paramétricos? Esta 
recopilación muestra como la literatura sobre el enfoque estructural ha respondido a 
cada una de estas preguntas. 
Clasificación JEL: C14, C70, D44, L10, L41 
Palabras Clave: Subastas, Enfoque Estructural, Colusión, Estimación No Paramétrica, 
Polinomios Locales. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The analysis of auctions is an active area of research for both theoretical and empirical 
economists. This paper provides an overview of the literature relevant to the 
econometrics of auctions from a structural approach perspective. The structural 
approach is a framework to analyze auction data in which theory and econometrics are 
closely related. There are three fundamental issues at the heart of the structural 
analysis: (i) Are there any testable restrictions imposed by the theoretic model on the 
data? (ii) Is it possible to identify the structural elements that characterize an auction 
without a priori parametric information? (iii) What can be said about feasible 
estimation procedures which do not rely on parametric assumptions?. This survey 
shows how the structural approach literature has answered each question. 
JEL Classification: C14, C70, D44, L10, L41 
Keywords: Auctions, Structural Approach, Collusion, Nonparametric Estimation, 
Local Polynomial Fitting. 
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ECONOMETRICS OF FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS: A SURVEY OF THE 
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED LITERATURE* 
 
FLORENCIA GABRIELLI*  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The analysis of auctions is an active area of research for both theoretical 
and empirical economists. This survey attempts to summarize the state of the 
literature in Auction Theory as well as the Econometric Methods mainly used 
to estimate the theoretical models. In particular, since most of the data sets 
available for empirical research come from first-price auctions mechanisms, I 
mainly concentrate in this auction type. 
Auctions and procurements are widely used mechanisms to allocate public 
contracts, financial assets, agricultural products, natural resources, artwork and 
electricity, to name a few. Also, auctions throughout the internet has become 
quite relevant in the last few years. Given the extensive use of auctions to 
allocate goods and services which are frequently public, many data sets are 
available for empirical research. 
Auctions have well defined rules that can be used to build a transparent 
economic model. The Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) concept allows to 
model auctions as a game in which a buyer/seller faces a limited number of 
participants that behave strategically. Auctions are typically modeled as games 
of incomplete information in which the asymmetry of information between the 
buyer/seller and the participants and among the participants themselves play a 
key role.  
Until recently, the empirical analysis of auction data was limited to test 
some predictions from the underlying game theoretical models (see Porter 
(1995) for an exhaustive survey on the Reduced Form Approach). This kind of 
analysis is known in the literature as the Reduced Form Approach. This 
approach has the drawback that does not allow to do policy evaluation that 
would require knowledge of the informational structure of the game, like the 
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optimal choice of the reserve price or the auction mechanism that would 
generate a greater revenue for the buyer/seller. 
On the other hand, the Structural Approach allows the researcher to do 
policy evaluation by assuming that observed bids are the equilibrium bids from 
some auction model. Specifically,          , where    denotes the (observed) 
bid made by player i,      is the equilibrium strategy and    is the 
(unobserved) private value that player i has for the auctioned item. It is 
assumed that private information of the players comes from some distribution, 
which is common knowledge for all participants. This distribution and the 
individual preferences are the key elements that explain the behavior, which 
are the structure of the model.  In other words these are the structural elements 
from the econometric model induced by observed bids.   
The Structural Approach then exploits the equilibrium relation            
to recover private information from participants, which then can be used to 
make policy recommendations. 
As recognized by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) an important 
difficulty associated to the Structural Approach is its numerical complexity 
and in the implicit form of the equilibrium strategy. There are three aspects 
that have to be taken into account. In the first place there is an Identification 
issue, that is if the structure of the auction can be recovered univocally from 
observable variables (bids) minimizing parametric restrictions. In other words, 
identification implies establishing if the corresponding models can be 
discriminated from observable variables. A second important issue is model 
validity that is if the theoretical model imposes testable restrictions on the data. 
Finally, a third difficulty is associated to the development of tractable 
estimation methods.  
In their seminal paper about structural analysis of auctions, Laffont and 
Vuong (1996) highlight that there are practical and theoretical reasons that 
have lead to an important development of Econometrics of Auctions. As 
mentioned above, there are important data sets that can be used, given that 
these mechanisms are extensively applied in the real work. On the other hand 
significant theoretical contributions to Industrial Organization have been done 
and now the challenge is to take such contributions to applied work. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the theoretical 
models developed in the literature. Section 3 describes the econometric 
methods available to estimate the models previously detailed. In particular in 
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this section I discuss in detail the “so called'” Structural Approach for 
analyzing auction data and estimating auction models.  Section 4 describes 
kernel methods and local polynomial fitting, two methods extensively used in 
the estimation of auction models. Section 5 analyzes how to incorporate 
cooperative behavior (e.g. collusion) in the models and how the econometric 
strategy can be adapted. Finally Section 6 collects the main conclusions. 
 
II. Auction theory 
 
In this section I present a unifying view of game-theoretical models of first-
price auctions from a structural econometric perspective.
1
 This framework has 
been analyzed by Laffont and Vuong (1996) following the theoretical 
contribution of Wilson (1977).  At a theoretical level the most general 
paradigm identified in the literature to model auctions is the Affiliated Value 
(AV) model which is defined by the pair            , where      represents 
the utility function and      denotes the distribution of the information bidders 
have. This information could be private to each bidder or common to all 
bidders. More precisely,          is the utility of a potential bidder  ,   
      for the object where $   denotes the  th player's private signal or 
information and   represents a common component or value affecting all 
utilities. The utility,     , is increasing in both arguments. The vector 
            is a realization of a random vector whose       dimensional 
cumulative distribution function is     . The latter is assumed to be affiliated 
with a support [   ]
 
  [   ]    , and a density     .2 Each bidder   knows 
the value of his signal,   , but neither the other signals    nor the common 
value  . On the other hand, the number   and the functions      and      are 
common knowledge. 
Depending on the nature of the utility function and that of the information 
held by bidders, a further sub classification produces the Affiliated Private 
Value (APV) paradigm in which         , and the General Common Value 
                                                          
1 For other mechanisms to model auctions such as second price, Dutch and English auctions the 
reader is refereed to Krishna (2002). 
2 Roughly speaking, affiliation is a strong form of positive correlation. In an auction context, 
private signals         are affiliated if when a subset of the   's are all large, then this makes 
it more likely that the remaining   's  are also large. For a formal definition see Krishna (2002). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                      ECONOMETRICS OF FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS…                          81 
paradigm, where         . Each model in turn is said to be symmetric if the 
function      is symmetric in its first   arguments, otherwise the models are 
called asymmetric. A special case of the APV model is the Independent Private 
Value (IPV) model. In the case of symmetric bidders, this model takes the 
form       with    independently and identically distributed as     . For the 
asymmetric IPV model, the utility function is still given by      , but (in its 
simplest form) one bidder draws his valuation from a distribution that differs 
from that of other bidders.  
 
II.1. Symmetric AV Model 
 
Among others, Wilson (1977) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) have 
characterized the Symmetric AV model. From this literature it is known that 
the Nash Equilibrium of this game is strictly increasing and is obtained from 
the following optimization problem. 
 
 
 
With         ,            ,      is the equilibrium strategy. It can be 
shown that the solution is given by,  
 
 
 
where    |         ∫    |    |      |    |    
  
 
  and     |    
         |      , the boundary condition is given by  ( )        . 
As can be seen in this case there is a closed form solution for the 
equilibrium.  
There are two special cases that have been extensively studied. In the first 
place the symmetric model with independent private values, the IPV model 
       and    iid as       (see Vickrey (1961), Riley and Samuelson(1981)). 
In the second place the symmetric common value model, the CV model 
(1) 
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      with    iid given   as   |   |   . In any of these two cases the 
equilibrium (1) simplifies (see Rothkopf (1969) and Wilson (1969)). 
 
II.1.1. Symmetric IPV Model 
 
In this paradigm bidders obtain their private valuations independently from 
a common distribution,         . In particular               . The BNE 
is symmetric, given that the game is symmetric. Therefore each player uses the 
same strategy     [   ]  [   ].  
This model has been extensively studied (see Riley and Samuelson (1981)). 
Several important theoretical results have been obtained from this model 
(Revenue Equivalence Theorem Vickrey (1961) and Optimal Reserve Price).
3
 
A single and indivisible object is offered for sale to   potential buyers who 
bid in an auction where the highest bidder gets the object and pays the amount 
of his bid. Each bidder   assigns a value    to the object, the maximum amount 
the bidder is willing to pay for the object. It is assumed that for each  , 
        is distributed according to the increasing distribution function        
with support on [   ].      is common knowledge and admits a continuous 
density      on [   ].    is the private information of bidder  . In other words, 
bidder   observes a realization    of    and only knows that other bidders' 
valuations are independent draws from     . The fact that for all  ,       
     is  referred  to  as  a  situation  involving  symmetric  bidders.  Let    
   [   ]      denote bidder  ’s strategy, which determines his bid for any 
private value. Given that bidders are symmetric, it is natural to concentrate on 
symmetric equilibrium, i.e.     . 
For a given bid,   , the payoffs for the  th bidder are given by 
 
                                   
                                                          
3 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem establishes that in the IPV paradigm ascending, 
descending, first-price and second-price auctions have  associated the same expected revenue for 
the seller. 
(2) 
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where in case of a tie among two or more bidders it is assumed that the object 
goes to each bidder with equal probability. From the expected profit function 
(2) above it can be seen that no bidder would bid an amount equal to his value 
since in this case the payoff would be zero. Thus, in equilibrium bidders shade 
their valuations. Notice also that a bidder faces a trade-off at any bid holding 
constant the behavior of his rivals. Indeed, by increasing one's bid, the 
probability of winning also increases, but at the same time there is a reduction 
in the gains from winning. More formally, the optimization problem for each 
bidder is 
 
 
 
where        denotes the inverse strategy function and           
    is the 
probability of winning. 
Riley and Samuelson (1981) among others have characterized the unique 
symmetric differentiable Bayesian Nash equilibrium.  When     the 
solution is unique and from the first order conditions (FOC) one has, 
 
 
 
subject to the boundary condition  ( )   . Then the solution can be written 
as,  
 
 
 
The expression in (3) shows that the equilibrium bid is less than the private 
value. Moreover, the degree of “shading” (the amount by which the bid is less 
than the value) depends on the number of competing bidders. In particular, the 
larger the number of competing bidders, the smaller the difference between 
(3) 
(4) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
84                                                               ECONÓMICA 
bids and private values (i.e. the degree of shading is less in auctions with more 
participating bidders). 
 
II.1.2. Symmetric APV Model 
 
A weakness of the IPV model is the restrictive assumption of independent 
values. A more general framework is therefore given by the APV model. In 
this case, bidders draw their private valuations from a joint and affiliated 
distribution         . Let            , the equilibrium strategy satisfies, 
 
 
 
for all    [   ], subject to the boundary condition  ( )   .    |    |   
denotes the conditional distribution of    given    and    |    |   is the 
conditional density. The index   refers to any player given that all are ex-ante 
identical. From Milgrom and Weber (1982) it is known that the solution is, 
 
 
 
This model with more reliable assumptions than the IPV model has also a 
wide potential for empirical applications.  
 
II.2. Asymmetric AV Model 
 
Asymmetries introduce numerous complications in first--price auctions. In 
particular, and despite the fact that equilibrium of this game exists under some 
regular conditions, there is no closed form expression for the bidding 
strategies. This further complicates the econometric analysis of this kind of 
auctions. I explain in section 3 how the use of indirect methods of estimation is 
especially useful in this context. Another feature of the asymmetric first--price 
(5) 
with 
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auction model is that the resulting allocation is not necessarily efficient; that is, 
the object may not end up in the hands of the bidder who values it the most.
4
 
The general theory is less developed for this kind of models. Asymmetries 
can arise because some players could be better informed than others, also 
because some players maybe better organized through cartels, other source of 
asymmetries are different characteristics of participants like size and location. 
Three special cases will be considered. 
1. Asymmetric IPV Model  
2. Asymmetric CV Model 
3. Asymmetric APV Model 
 
II.2.1. Asymmetric IPV Model 
 
In this case      ,and I am going to consider that      ,         ,    
  . It is clear that the problem faced by player 1 is different than the one faced 
by the rest of the bidders.  
A limitation of symmetric models is the assumption that all bidders are ex-
ante identical, which may not be the case in many situations that are observed 
in empirical applications. To simplify the exposition I assume that there are 
two types of bidder. The model can easily be extended to a situation with more 
than two types.
5
 For instance, group 1 could be the one containing better 
informed bidders or bigger size bidders, etc. Group 2 gathers all other bidders. 
Let    be the number of players of type  ,       with          . The 
model assumes that inside each group or type players are ex-ante identical, that 
is their valuations are iid random variables from      . Therefore          
     
       
  . Each one of these distributions are common knowledge and 
have common support, [   ].6 The corresponding densities are       and       
which are assumed to be continuously differentiable and bounded away from 
                                                          
4 As is well known in the auction theory literature, the Revenue Equivalence Principle holds 
under the assumption of symmetry (see see Krishna (2002) for further details). 
5 For an application with three types of bidder see for example Aryal and Gabrielli (2013). 
6 The assumption of a common support is for simplicity. 
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zero on their support.
7
 The equilibrium strategies       and       have in 
general no closed form. Thus the use of numerical methods becomes 
necessary, a major difficulty associated to these kinds of models. Moreover, 
assume that these strategies are increasing and differentiable with inverses 
     
   and      
  . The expected payoff of a type 1 bidder, say, when a 
type 2 bidder follows the strategy       is  
 
 
 
where                 denotes the distribution of type 2 bidders' bids. 
The equilibrium strategies       and       do not have closed form solution 
in general. Nevertheless, these strategies satisfy the following system of 
differential equations.
8
 
 
 
 
subject to the boundary conditions   ( )    ( ) and            . 
 
II.2.2. Asymmetric CV Model 
 
Assume that one bidder is fully informed and the remaining are 
uninformed.      for all players with      and       for    . In 
addition,        . The strategy of the informed bidder is,  
 
                                                          
7 This set of regularity conditions guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
See, e.g Lebrun (1996, 1999), and Maskin and Riley (2000a,b, 2003). 
8 To see an example which uses Uniform distributions see Krishna (2002). 
 
(6) 
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Non informed bidders should adopt mixed strategies      in the interval 
        , so that the maximum bid mimics the distribution of the informed 
bidder, that is, 
 
 
 
II.2.3. Asymmetric APV Model 
 
In this case and under the assumption that there are two types of bidders 
this model considers that the vector                       is distributed 
according to the joint distribution     . This function is assumed to be 
exchangeable in its first    components and also in its last    components. The 
intuition behind this probabilistic structure is that inside a group or type 
players are ex-ante identical. Moreover, since      is affiliated there is general 
dependence among private values. Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (1998) have 
characterized the system of differential equations that define the equilibrium of 
this game. Given that this model belongs to the asymmetric paradigm there is 
no closed form solution.  
 
II.3. Identification and Testeable Restricctions: the symmetric case 
 
The main hypothesis behind the Structural Approach is that observed bids 
are the equilibrium bids of the auction model under consideration. Given   and 
the structure            , the equilibrium strategy of the game induces the 
following econometric model, 
 
  
 
It is important to notice that    is a random variable which is non-observed 
but is distributed according to     . Therefore    are also random variables 
(6) 
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distributed according to the function      that is determined by the structural 
elements of the model. In this sense, the function      depends on        
through two different channels:  
 
1. The    , given that         . 
 
2. Through the equilibrium strategy,      (see e.g. (4))  
 
These characteristics that are proper to auction models further complicate 
the identification and characterization of theoretical restrictions on data. Thus, 
in order to be able to establish “Identification” one takes   and observed bids 
as given, that is this is the only available information for the research to 
identify the model.
9
  
 
First, it is necessary to precise what is being understood by models that can 
not be identified or distinguish one from another. The following definition 
intents to clarify this issue. 
 
Definition: two models   and  ̃ are observationally equivalent given the 
(observed) bids           if both rationalize the same equilibrium bid 
distribution, that is,       ̃   . 
 
The seminal work of  Laffont and Vuong (1996) establishes a series of 
results about the identification (or lack of it) for the models outlined the 
previous section. Here I replicate these results and give some intuition about 
them.  
 
Proposition 1:  Any symmetric AV model is observationally equivalent 
to some symmetric APV model. Thus a symmetric AV model is 
unidentified, in general. 
                                                          
9 This framework is quite realistic since typically the only available information are observed 
bids and the number of bidders, besides observed heterogeneity that can easily be incorporated 
in the analysis. 
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The proof of this result (not given) is based on the following key 
observation.            can always be replaced by   ̃    ̃ with   ̃  
        . In other words, dependence among utilities given by the common 
component  , can be replaced by (appropriate) dependence among private 
signals. Therefore, without loss of generality it is enough to concentrate in the 
identification of the APV model        , given that this constitutes the most 
general model that can be identified.  
 
The next result establishes that the IPV model is indeed identified from 
observed bids. 
 
Proposition 2:  A symmetric APV model is identified. 
 
The intuition behind this result can be expressed as follows: given that 
(observed) bids are related with private values through the equilibrium strategy 
which is strictly increasing, then      can be identified from     . 
 
Proposition 3:  A symmetric IPV model is identified. 
 
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) contains a formal proof of this 
statement. The intuition behind this result is similar to that behind Proposition 
2 above.  
 
As Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) emphasize, the equilibrium relation 
that links the observed bid    to the underlying private value    is strictly 
monotonic which implies that the identification problem is non-trivial.  The 
difficulty associated to the identification problem relies on the fact that the 
distribution      of    depends on the underlying distribution      in two 
ways: directly through   , which is distributed as     , and indirectly through 
the equilibrium strategy     , which depends on      (see (4)).   
Theorem 1 in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) solves the identification 
problem by stating that the distribution      is unique whenever it exists. In 
addition, it gives a necessary and sufficient condition on the distribution      
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for the existence of a distribution      of bidders' private values that can 
rationalize     . 
This result relies upon the fact that the first derivative       and the 
distribution      with its density      can be eliminated at the same time from 
the differential equation (4) by introducing the distribution      of    and its 
density     . Specifically, for every   [   ]  [      ] one has that 
                                                , where the 
last equality uses       .  It follows that the distribution      is absolutely 
continuous with support [      ] and  density                , where 
         .  Taking the ratio gives                                . 
Thus the differential equation (4) becomes 
 
 
 
Equation (8) shows the individual private value    as a function of the 
individual's equilibrium bid   , its distribution     , its density      and the 
number of bidders  . 
In other words, (8) states that if    is the equilibrium bid, as it is assumed in 
the structural approach, then the bidder's private value    corresponding to    
must satisfy (8). 
It is important to highlight that for the identification argument outlined 
above it is not necessary to solve the FOC of the underlying theoretic model. 
In particular, the identification of the structural model does not require a priori 
parametric specifications.  Moreover, because it is nonparametric in nature, 
this identification result applies to parametric identification as well.  
Another important aspect to note is that the function          is 
completely determined from the knowledge of      and  .  Because          
is the quasi inverse of         , one has neither to solve the differential 
equation (8) nor to apply numerical integration in (3) so as to determine the 
buyers' equilibrium strategy         . This remark is important because it 
underlies the principle and the computational advantages of the indirect 
estimation method proposed by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). 
(8) 
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Regarding CV models, the general result is that they are not identified, 
which arises from Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 4:  A symmetric CV model is unidentified, in general. 
 
To better understand the intuition behind this result one has to observe the 
fact that if new signals   ̃ are defined as strictly increasing transformation of 
the original signals   , then it is clear that the identification of this model is not 
possible.
10
 
The results stated above establish the identification of some of the models 
in the symmetric case, and the lack of identification in other cases. The next 
step is to see if there are testable restrictions from theory on the data. To this 
end, I maintain the assumption that      is symmetric and affiliated. Given 
that          ,    it follows that      is also symmetric and affiliated 
in [   ]
 
. 
The distribution      of the bids           is rationalized by a structure 
            if      is the equilibrium distribution of the corresponding game. 
Proposition 1 implies that the restrictions imposed on an AV model are the 
same that can be imposed on an APV model (beyond symmetry and 
affiliation). Define the following function that is needed for the next result. Let 
 {  |  }  |   be the conditional distribution of              given   . 
   
Proposition 5:  A distribution      can be rationalized by a symmetric 
APV model if and only if the function 
 
 
 
is strictly increasing in    [   ]. 
  
                                                          
10 Recall that the CV model has been characterized within the unified framework used in this 
paper as      with    iid given  , see section 2.1. 
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It is important to highlight that      (the strategy actually used by bidders) 
might not be the same as      (the equilibrium strategy) that is obtained from 
the FOC of the game. Thus, in order to test if bidders behave as predictive by 
game theory one has to corroborate if       is strictly increasing, otherwise 
      can not be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy. To prove this 
proposition one needs to use the FOC of the game and a similar argument to 
that in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). 
The next result concerns IPV models, which are a special case of APV 
models. Thus, the testable restrictions imposed by theory are readily 
characterized. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) contains a formal proof of 
this argument. 
 
Proposition 6:  A distribution      can be rationalized by a symmetric 
IPV model if and only if  
 
1.            ∏       
 
    for some distribution       with support  
[   ]; and  
2. the function         
 
   
     
     
  is strictly increasing in    [   ]. 
 
The first part says that valuations are independent and identically 
distributed (iid). The second part characterizes the equilibrium strategy and 
establishes the theoretical restriction that one should test. 
As mentioned above, the state of the art is less developed for (symmetric) 
CV models, and consequently the restrictions coming from game theory are 
not fully available. More recently, there have been some results Hendricks, 
Pinkse, and Porter (2003), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003)). However, it is clear 
that the equilibrium bids in a CV model should be dependent while in an IPV 
model they are independent. Therefore, in principle IPV and CV models can 
be distinguished.  
 
II.4. Identification and Testeable Restricctions: the asymmetric case 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                      ECONOMETRICS OF FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS…                          93 
In this section I present the main results about identification and testable 
restrictions coming from theory for the models characterized in section 2.2.  
The questions that these results address are the following. 
 
 Are any of these models identified? (Propositions 7 and 8). 
 Are there theoretical restrictions that each model imposes over the 
distributions of bids? (Propositions 7 and 8). 
 Can these asymmetric models be distinguished from observed bids? 
(Proposition 9). 
 It is possible to distinguish an asymmetric model from a symmetric 
one? (Proposition 10). 
 
Proposition 7:  The asymmetric IPV model of section 2.2.1 is identified. 
Moreover, a distribution      can be rationalized by such a model if 
and only if: 
1-                  ∏       
 
    for some distributions       and 
     ; and 
2- the functions 
 
 
are strictly increasing in    [   ], the common support of       and 
      . 
 
The next result establishes that it is possible to identify the asymmetric CV 
model of section 2.2.2 and what are the theoretical restriction on it. 
 
Proposition 8:  The asymmetric CV model of section II.2.2. is 
identified. Moreover, a distribution     can be rationalized by such a 
model if and only if: 
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1-                  ∏      
 
    for some distributions       and 
    ; and 
2-         
       and the function 
 
is strictly increasing in    [   ], the common support of       and 
    . 
 
Despite the fact that each model is identified it is valid to ask whether these 
two asymmetric models can be discriminated from observed bids. In order to 
answer the third question above I present the following result.  
 
Proposition 9: Any asymmetric CV model is observationally equivalent 
to an asymmetric IPV model. 
 
The proof of this result follows from using Propositions 7 and 8 and taking 
          and the same       in both cases. 
 
Finally, in order to answer the last question above it is enough to consider 
the case    . Then, the conditions of Propositions 8 and 6 are equivalent, 
leading to the following statement.  
 
Proposition 10:  Any asymmetric CV model need not be distinguishable 
forma a symmetric one. 
 
III. Econometrics of Auctions 
 
The availability of numerous data sets and the well-defined game forms 
associated with auctions mechanisms makes “econometrics of auctions” a 
particularly interesting field within economics. There are three main 
approaches to analyze auction data. The experimental approach, aimed to test 
the predictions of game-theoretic models, uses experimental data for 
controlling the underlying elements of the model. The reduced-form approach 
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uses field data mostly relying on linear regressions of the logarithm of bids on 
a set of observed variables. These first two approaches were used almost 
exclusively until the late 1980s constituting the first step towards the 
formulation of empirical auction models. Most recently, a so--called structural 
approach has been developed. A detailed discussion and references to this 
literature is given by Perrigne and Vuong (1999, 2008) survey papers. In 
particular these authors concentrate on first-price auctions within the private 
value paradigm.
11
 
 
III.1. Structural Approach to Analyze Auction Data 
 
Assuming that observed bids are the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game-
theoretical model under consideration, the structural approach provides a rich 
framework in which the theoretical model and its empirical counterpart are 
closely related. The main objective of this approach is to recover the structural 
elements of the auction model. This line of research has attracted considerable 
attention over the last fifteen years. 
A first classification of methods for structurally estimating auction models 
distinguishes between direct methods and indirect methods. In turn, these 
methods can be parametric, if some of the structural elements are assumed to 
be known except for a finite number of parameters. Also, non-parametric 
techniques can be used to estimate. In this case there are no assumptions about 
the functional form of the structural elements. 
Relying on parametric econometric models, direct methods were first 
developed in the literature. The starting point is to specify the underlying 
distribution of private values in order to estimate the parameter vector 
characterizing such a distribution. Within this class of methods, there are two 
major estimation procedures. The first methodology introduced by Paarsch 
(1992) and Donald and Paarsch (1993) is a fully parametric setup that uses 
ML-based estimation procedures requiring the computation of the equilibrium 
                                                          
11 See also Paarsch and Hong (2006) for an extensive survey on structural estimation of auction 
models within the IPV paradigm. Hendricks and Porter (2007) contain an exhaustive 
recompilation of examples within the Reduced Form Approach. On the other hand Athey and 
Haile (2007)have documented the use of nonparametric techniques to estimate structural auction 
models. 
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strategy. This in turn could be highly computationally demanding, as 
recognized by Donald and Paarsch (1993), and thus only very simple 
distributions are considered in practice. In particular, because the upper bound 
of the bid distribution depends on the parameter(s) of the underlying 
distribution, the ML estimator has a nonstandard limiting distribution. In view 
of this, Donald and Paarsch (1993) develop a so-called piecewise pseudo ML 
estimator requiring the computation of the equilibrium strategy that can be 
obtained using specific parametric distribution(s). Donald and Paarsch (1993) 
have established the asymptotic properties of this estimator, that is, they have 
shown its consistency and that it distribution converges to a normal 
distribution at the parametric √  rate.12 Marshall, Meurer, Richard, and 
Stromquist (1994) propose a set of numerical algorithms to solve for the 
equilibrium strategy of an asymmetric first-price auction allowing for arbitrary 
distributions of the private values. 
In a second paper, Donald and Paarsch (1996) study the identification 
problem of the parameter  , and also the properties of the ML estimator in the 
case in which the upper extreme of the support depends on the unknown 
parameter. The asymptotic distribution that they obtain for this estimator is 
non-standard which constitutes a drawback in practice. Both methods based on 
ML are subject to two major limitations. In the first place they only allow 
including observable heterogeneity (of auctions) through discrete variables. In 
the second place there is the great complexity to compute these estimators 
given that the associate routines are quite complex and require the calculation 
of the equilibrium strategy and its inverse to determine the upper bound of the 
bid distribution and density. 
Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) introduced a second methodology, 
which is more computationally convenient. Relying on the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem, the authors propose a simulation-based method that 
avoids computation of the equilibrium strategy and therefore allows for more 
general parametric specifications for the private value distribution. This 
method is called simulated nonlinear least squares (SNLLS) and is related to 
the methods proposed by McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989). The 
SNLLS estimator of Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) uses only the winning 
bid since the authors considered a descending oral auction of eggplants in their 
application. The authors establish the asymptotic properties of the estimator, 
                                                          
12    denotes the number of auctions considered for estimation, i.e. the sample size. 
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namely its consistency and normality at the parametric √  for a given number 
of simulations and the number of auctions goes to infinity. The main 
advantage of this method is that is not necessary to compute the equilibrium 
strategy or its inverse. This makes this method attractive from a computational 
point of view and also makes it usable with any parametric family of 
distributions     .13 Li and Vuong (1997) extended the SNLLS estimator to 
the case in which all bids are observed, such as in sealed-bid auctions. 
The use of indirect methods to structurally estimate auction models was 
introduced in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). The authors develop a fully 
nonparametric procedure for the structural estimation of auction models. This 
alternative methodology relies on a simple but crucial observation, namely that 
each private value can be expressed as a function of the corresponding bid, the 
distribution of observed bids and its density using the first-order condition of 
the bidder's optimization problem. Thus, in contrast to direct methods, the 
starting point of indirect procedures is the distribution of (observed) bids, 
which is used to recover the distribution of (unobserved) private values 
without computing the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy or its inverse 
explicitly. 
The main advantage of this method is therefore that it does not require to 
solve the differential equation (or system of equations) that characterize the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and thus it is not necessary to have an analytical 
solution for the underlying theoretical model. Moreover, given the 
nonparametric nature of this method, the entire procedure is not subject to 
parametric assumptions and does not restrict a priori the function      to 
belong to some class of specific distributions. Another advantage of the 
indirect procedures is that they allow the derivation of important identification 
results and testable restrictions coming from game theory that can be used to 
validate the model. 
Based on the equation that defines the inverse of the equilibrium strategy, 
the authors show that the model is nonparametrically identified in an IPV 
framework. Other papers by the same authors and others consider other 
auction models in a similar fashion. Including the affiliated private value 
model, models with asymmetric bidders, dynamic auction models and model 
with risk averse bidders. Laffont and Vuong (1996) generalize the 
                                                          
13 In the empirical application, Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) use a log-normal distribution. 
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identification result in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) to symmetric APV 
models.
14
 
The method in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) calls for a two step 
procedure. In the first step, a sample of pseudo private values is obtained while 
using nonparametric estimators for the distribution and density of observed 
bids. With this pseudo sample, the second step consists of estimating the 
density of bidders' private values nonparametrically. This estimator is shown 
to have desirable properties such us uniform consistency and the achievement 
of the optimal convergence rate by appropriate choice of vanishing rates for 
bandwidths. 
 
IV. Nonparametric Estimators 
 
For the last sixty years the statistical literature on nonparametric methods 
has developed considerably. This methodology proves to be especially useful 
in cases, in which one has no precise information about the form and class of, 
e.g., the true density of a random variable. The histogram is one of the oldest 
nonparametric methods for density estimation; it has the disadvantage of being 
discontinuous and too “rough”. There are several other methods available in 
this literature, such as kernels, splines, nearest-neighbor and local polynomials 
(see Härdle (1991) and Pagan and Ullah (1999) for a comprehensive 
discussion). By far, the most widely used is the kernel method. 
Every method has some cost associated with it. The major problem cited in 
the literature faced by nonparametric procedures is the “curse of 
dimensionality”. The precision of the estimator (exponentially) deteriorates 
when the number of variables increases. That is, large data sets are needed to 
get accurate estimators. 
 
IV.1. Kernel Density Estimators 
 
The idea behind the estimation of a density,     , using kernel estimation is 
very similar to the histogram. However, in kernel estimation one averages over 
kernel functions instead of averaging over data points. 
                                                          
14 Laffont and Vuong (1996) explicitly acknowledge that their identification result is a 
generalization of a result in a previous version of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). 
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More formally, let        be a sequence of random vectors in  
 , where 
each    is distributed as      with density     . A kernel density estimator of 
the density      at       is defined as 
 
 
 
where     is a bandwidth and      is a kernel (see Parzen (1962) and 
Rosenblatt (1956)). The bandwidth   is a smoothing parameter which 
regulates the degree of smoothness of the estimator. 
The following assumptions are sufficient to obtain a pointwise consistent 
estimator, 
1. The kernel      is a bounded, even and integrable function from    to   
with ∫         . In particular, because     is bounded,  ̂    has finite 
moments of any order. 
2. The random vectors        are independent and identically distributed. 
3.      is continuous at  . 
4.      is a Parzen-Rosenblatt kernel. More precisely,      satisfies 
 
where || || is the Euclidean norm on   . For instance, a function      with 
bounded support satisfies this condition.
15
 
5.     , where {  }     is a nonstochastic sequence satisfying 
a)      and 
b)      , as     
The kernel estimator  ̂    has (further) desirable statistical properties. The 
asymptotic distribution of the estimator has been derived under additional 
regularity conditions. Also, uniform consistency has been established by 
strengthening some of the underlying assumptions. See e.g., Silverman (1986) 
or Bierens (1983) for a rigorous treatment and proofs of all these results 
mentioned above and the assumptions needed in each case. 
                                                          
15 This assumption can be weakened if one is willing to make global assumptions on      such 
as it is bounded over   . 
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As is well-known in the statistical literature, nonparametric estimators 
attain a lower convergence rate than parametric ones. For the kernel density 
estimator the best (uniform) rate of convergence has been established by Stone 
(1982) and it is given by $           {        }, where   is the “degree” 
of smoothness of     . 
Next, I provide expressions for the bias and variance of this estimator. 
Bias of  ̂   : 
 
where  
 
Variance of  ̂   : 
 
 
IV.2. Local Polynomial Fitting 
 
In this section I describe the main characteristics of local polynomial 
estimators.
16
 I present the estimator for the case of one-dimensional 
explanatory variables        . 
Let                  , be an independent and identically distributed 
sample from a population      . The objective is to estimate the regression 
function $         |      and its derivatives 
        
          
     . Assume that the      st derivative of      
exists at the point   . Using a Taylor expansion for   in a neighborhood of   , 
the regression function      can be locally approximated by a polynomial of 
order  , that is 
 
 
                                                          
16 The discussion in this section follows closely Fan and Gijbels (1996). The reader is referred to 
this text for further details. 
(9) 
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In terms of a weighted least squares (LS) regression problem one can write 
 
 
 
where   is a bandwidth and                with   a kernel function 
assigning weights to each observation. 
Let  ̂ ,         be the solution to the LS problem (10). By comparing 
the Taylor expansion in (9) to the LS problem (10) it is clear that  ̂       
   ̂  is an estimator for 
                . 
To derive an expression for  ̂ it is more convenient to work with matrix 
notation. Let   denote the matrix of regressors of problem (10) and organize 
the variables  s and the estimators  ̂  in column vectors, i.e. 
 
 
 
Further, let   be the     diagonal matrix of weights: 
      {         }. Then the weighted LS problem above can be written 
as 
 
 
with   (       )
 
. From LS theory the solution to this problem is given 
by 
 
 
 
(10) 
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Like in the case of kernel estimators there are expressions for the 
(conditional) bias and variance of the LPE.  The following theorem by Ruppert 
and Wand (1994) establishes the asymptotic expansions for the bias and 
variance of the estimator  ̂          ̂   First I need to introduce the 
following notation. Let    ∫ 
          and $   ∫ 
          . Also 
let   ( {   }){       },   ̃  ( {     }){       }  
  (    ){       }, 
   (            )
 
,  ̃  (            )
 
. Further, consider the unit 
vector $                    
 , with 1 on the      st position. 
 
Theorem [Ruppert and Wand (1994)]: Assume that         and that 
    ,         and      are continuous in a neighborhood of   . Further, 
assume that     and     .  
Then the asymptotic conditional variance of ̂       is given by 
 
 
 
The asymptotic conditional bias for     odd is given by 
 
 
 
Further, for     even the asymptotic conditional bias is  
 
 
 
provided that       and $         $ are continuous in a neighborhood of 
   and   
   . 
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From the above theorem it is clear that there is a theoretical distinction 
between the cases     odd and     even. Moreover, polynomial fits with 
     odd outperform those with     even. For an exhaustive and detailed 
discussion see Fan and Gijbels (1996). 
As with kernel estimators the crucial choice for LPEs is the bandwidth 
parameter. Of less importance (in practice) is the choice of the order of the 
polynomial,   and the kernel used for weighting. Optimal choices for 
bandwidths and kernels involved in LP estimation have been studied in the 
statistical literature. With respect to the choice of  , Fan and Gijbels (1996) 
emphasize that for many applications the “rule”       suffices. 
LP fitting has a number of attractive features both from theoretical and 
practical point of view. The most relevant is the behavior of these estimators at 
the boundaries. Put in other words, the bias at the boundary stays automatically 
of the same order as in the interior, without the use of specific boundary 
kernels. This is remarkably different from kernel estimation (and other 
nonparametric methods as well).
17
 On top of the advantages at the boundaries, 
LPEs have nice minimax efficiency properties; the asymptotic minimax 
efficiency for commonly used orders is 100% among all linear estimators and 
only a small loss has to be tolerated beyond this class.
18
  
 
V. Collusion 
 
In this section I present the relevant theoretical background to analyze 
collusive models and how the literature has managed the econometric problem 
derived from this theoretical framework. To make the presentation of the 
model more transparent I consider the two-bidder case here. Although this 
section explains the theoretical framework for an auction model, it could be 
that bidders compete for the right to sell their services and thus the winner is 
the bidder with the lowest bid. The main features of the auction model outlined 
here are the same for the procurement setting with the appropriate sign 
changes. 
                                                          
17 See Silverman (1986), Fan and Marron (1993) 
18 LPEs belong to the class of linear smoothers. This class includes the Nardaraya-Watson 
estimator, the Gasser-Müller estimator, orthogonal series estimators and spline smoothers. 
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Although collusion is an illegal activity, it is a pervasive problem in auction 
markets such as public construction, school milk supply, stamps; see 
(Comanor and Schankerman (1976), Feinstein, Block, and Nold (1985), Lang 
and Rosenthal (1991), Porter and Zona (1993), Bajari (2001), Porter and Zona 
(1999), Pesendorfer (2000), Asker (2010) and Harrington (2008)) and 
municipal bonds among others.  In this section I briefly discuss the relevant 
theoretical and empirical work that has been done in an attempt to better 
understand and detect this practice. As emphasized by Baldwin, Marshall, and 
Richard (1997) the profitability and prevalence of bid rigging call for the 
incorporation of the possibility of collusive behavior into empirical models. 
Theoretical work on bidder collusion at auctions is extensive. The 
following description is by no means exhaustive. Robinson (1985) analyzes 
the relative propensity of the different auction formats, second-price, first-
price, and English auctions, to collusion. In particular, the author shows the 
relative no susceptibility of first-price auctions to bidder collusion. The 
analysis of collusion in second-price auctions was initiated by Graham and 
Marshall (1987) in a symmetric IPV model. Graham, Marshall, and Richard 
(1990) extend previous results to the case of distributionally heterogeneous 
bidders.
19
 McAfee and McMillan (1992) analyze collusion in first price 
auctions by an all-inclusive coalition. They also study a pre-auction knockout 
mechanism used by the cartel. As is well-known, asymmetric first--price 
auction models yield an equilibrium with no closed form.
20
 Marshall, Meurer, 
Richard, and Stromquist (1994) look at less than all--inclusive cartels at first--
price auctions and propose numerical techniques to solve for the equilibrium of 
the underlying asymmetric game. From a more policy-oriented view, Marshall 
and Meurer (2004) argue that the relative lack of attention given to bidder 
collusion is based on the mistaken belief that the economics of bidder 
collusion and that of price fixing are essentially equivalent. The authors 
illustrate the differences between standard industry posted-price cartels and 
collusion by bidders at auctions or procurements by means of several models 
and examples. Moreover, they propose policy recommendations that apply 
specifically to bidder collusion. The article by Hendricks, Porter, and Tan 
                                                          
19 Also, the work by Mailath and Zemsky (1991) is also another excellent reference for collusion 
in second– price auctions. I would like to thank a referee for pointing this out. 
20 Except for some special cases (see footnote 8). 
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(2008) extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and 
common value environments. 
The empirical literature on bidder collusion is more limited. Hendricks and 
Porter’s (1989) survey paper discusses mechanisms that are likely to facilitate 
collusion in auctions and propose some tests in order to detect bid rigging by 
analyzing two commonly used data sets within both the IPV framework and 
the Common Value (CV) framework. Porter and Zona (1993, 1999) and 
Pesendorfer (2000) concentrate on collusion in auction markets given that it is 
known that bid--rigging has taken place. The objective of these papers is 
basically to find empirical facts in collusive markets. 
Another set of empirical papers proposes methods to detect collusion. 
Porter and Zona (1993), Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) and Bajari and 
Ye (2003) study collusion in IPV settings. The paper by Asker (2010) seeks to 
better understand the functioning of an operating cartel. Within the structural 
approach, the author examines a first--price knockout auction mechanism used 
by a cartel of stamp dealers in the 1990s. 
Porter and Zona (1993) argue that detection of collusion is possible because 
of limited participation in the collusive setup. Accordingly, they attempt to 
detect differences in behavior between ring members and non-members. The 
authors have detailed information of the operation of a cartel and its bidding 
practices. In particular they study the bidding behavior of firms competing for 
highway construction projects on Long Island in the early 1980s. They propose 
two types of analysis. The first one is based on the level of bids and the second 
one on the ranking of bids. Accordingly, Porter and Zona (1993) argue that the 
evidence of collusive behavior relies on the fact that the lowest non-cartel 
bidder's behavior is not statistically different from that of other non-cartel 
firms, while the determinants of the low cartel bid differ from those of higher 
cartel bids. By knowing the identities of cartel members Porter and Zona 
(1993) estimate two models for each subgroup of bidders and test the null 
hypothesis of absence of collusion by testing the equality of parameter values 
in the models. The starting point for each (econometric) model is given by the 
first order conditions for an equilibrium strategy, namely 
 
 
 
(11) 
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where     is the submitted bid for firm   in project  ,     is the corresponding 
cost, and     is the probability of winning. 
Regarding the analysis based on the level of bids, Porter and Zona (1993) 
exploit the characterization of the equilibrium bid given by (11) and assume 
that equilibrium behavior satisfies the log-linear bidding rule 
 
 
 
where    is an auction-specific effect,     is a vector of observable variables 
affecting firm  's probability of winning object  . In the empirical application 
the authors include the utilization rate, the firm's backlog and capacity and a 
dummy variable regarding the location of the firm. The error term,    , 
represents private information for firm   on project  . It is assumed to have 
zero expectation and an auction-specific variance,   
 . 
By estimating the auction-specific variance using the auction mean-squared 
residual, the authors implement a feasible generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimator to obtain estimates for the parameters in (12). The reported results 
are given for three subsets of data: bids from all firms, bids from competitive 
firms and bids from cartel firms only. The authors conjecture that if all bids 
were competitive, the three subsets of data should give the same underlying 
parameters. On the other hand, if cartel bids were not competitive, then the 
model would be misspecified, and only the estimators based on competitive 
data would be consistent. 
The two main conclusions from this analysis indicate that the model fits the 
competitive data reasonably well according to a Wald test and that bids from 
cartel firms statistically differ from those of competitive firms. The authors 
claim that the analysis based on the ranking of bids (i.e. the second kind of test 
proposed by the authors) sheds light on the reasons for this discrepancy. 
To perform an analysis based on the ranking of bids, the main argument 
used by Porter and Zona (1993) states that fundamental differences may exist 
between the ordering of competitive and cartel bids conditional on observed 
data. This observation relies on the fact that firms submitting phantom bids 
know that a designated firm will submit a lower bid (recall that Porter and 
Zona (1993) study a procurement-auction). Thus, complementary bids have no 
probability of winning by design. The rationale for phantom bidding is just to 
(12) 
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create the appearance of competition. However, the designated cartel bid must 
bid competitively like the remaining non-cartel firms. The authors do not 
explain how the designated bidder is selected. 
From this observation, Porter and Zona (1993) propose a rank-based test 
intended to detect differences in the ordering of higher bids, as opposed to the 
determinants of the probability of being the lowest bid, for each set of firms. 
The conjecture in this case is that if cartel bids were indeed competitive, their 
ordering should reflect observable cost differences. 
To implement the rank test the authors use equation (12) to characterize the 
probability of winning by approximating it with a multinomial logit (MNL) 
model as follows 
 
 
 
Let              . The MNL model giving the log probability that firm   
will win auction   is, 
 
 
 
By exponentiation of the log probabilities, equation (13) can be expressed 
as 
 
 
 
Given the MNL specification chosen by the authors, the probability of 
observing any particular ranking of bids on a project can be expressed as the 
product of individual choice probabilities. If    bids are submitted on job $\el, 
      , the likelihood of observing the rankings of the data from all 
auctions in the sample is 
 
(13) 
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where    denotes the index of the firm with bid ranked  (see Porter and Zona 
(1993) for further details). 
The model is estimated using standard maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation for MNL. If the model is correctly specified, the parameters can be 
estimated from any subset of the data. To test the hypothesis of no phantom 
bidding the authors use a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. In other words, the null 
hypothesis states that the parameters estimated using only the lowest cartel 
ranks and those estimated from higher cartel ranks should be the same. As 
pointed out in the paper, rejection of the null hypothesis could be because of 
two reasons. First, the model may be misspecified for some reason other than 
phantom bidding. However, the authors argue that if the test did not reject the 
null when applied to competitive data, then it is less likely to have a 
specification problem. The second reason leading to rejection could be due to 
an effect that is common to non-winning cartel bids but not non-winning 
competitive bids. Porter and Zona (1993) conclude that under the assumptions 
of the model, the rejection is likely to be the result of phantom bidding. 
The main conclusion drawn from the analysis of competitive bid rank data 
states that the same process generates these bids whether or not they are low. 
In other words, the estimates are stable over ranks and the LR test does not 
lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of no model misspecification. The 
second analysis based on cartel bid rank data yields the opposite conclusion, 
namely that cartel bids are generated by a different process depending on 
whether or not they are low. 
Finally, the authors conclude that they have found evidence supporting 
cartel activity in the sample since they do not have reason to believe that the 
difference between cartel and competitive bidding is structural. 
Bajari and Ye (2003) propose a model in which bidders are asymmetric in a 
procurement first-price-auction setup. The authors derive two conditions that 
must hold under competitive bidding, namely, conditional independence of 
bids and exchangeability of bid distributions. They also propose a third test 
based on Bayesian techniques which requires inside information from the 
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industry. Bajari and Ye (2003) apply their tests to a data set on seal coat 
contracts in the Midwest. 
I now explain this set of conditions in more detail. 
 
Let                 denote a set of covariates that is observable to all 
firms. Let         be the cumulative distribution function of firm  's bid given 
covariates. Observe that the distribution of bids depends on the entire vector  . 
Conditional on    , firm  's bid and firm  's bid are independently 
distributed. As a result 
 
 
 
where              is the joint distribution of bids. As mentioned in Bajari 
and Ye (2003) there is more than one way of testing this condition. Ideally 
each side of (14) can be estimated nonparametrically and compared. However 
with limited data this becomes less attractive. Alternatively, regression-based 
methods can be used. That is the marginal distribution,         , can be 
estimated using a regression (see also Porter and Zona (1993, 1999)), and then 
the residuals are tested to assess if they are independent. 
The second condition that must hold in equilibrium when bidding is 
competitive is referred to as exchangeability of the distribution of bids. More 
formally, let   be a permutation, that is, a one-to-one mapping from the set 
{     } onto itself. Then exchangeability is defined as follows: for any 
permutation   and any index   the following equality must hold 
 
 
Like for conditional independence, regression-based methods can be used 
to test this condition. This is the approach taken in Bajari and Ye (2003). 
The papers by Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) and Asker (2010) 
use a structural approach to analyze auction data.
21
 Baldwin, Marshall, and 
                                                          
21 In the following section I explain in more details the structural approach used in the literature 
as opposed to reduced form approach. 
(14) 
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Richard’s (1997) data set comes from oral ascending auctions. Therefore, the 
authors concentrate on this auction format to derive the econometric models 
used in the application. Moreover, one of the maintained assumptions in that 
paper is distributional homogeneity across bidders' valuations (i.e. bidders are 
symmetric). At a more technical level, the empirical model is fully parametric. 
On the other hand, the work by Asker (2010) considers asymmetries across 
bidders. However, its main objective is to analyze the functioning of a cartel as 
opposed to study the main auction. The knockout auction is conducted using a 
sealed-bid format. The author focuses in modeling the pre-auction knockout 
mechanism used by the ring to designate the serious bidder at the main 
auction. The econometric procedure used is fully nonparametric. 
Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) formulate various empirical models 
using the structural approach allowing for both bidder collusion and supply 
effects in order to analyze auctions for timber in the Pacific Northwest. The 
main objective is to determine whether price variations, conditional on demand 
characteristics, are better explained by collusion or, alternative, variations in 
timber supply conditions. The authors provide some evidence revealing the 
similarity between the winning bid and the reserve price in timber auctions 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. This information motivates the 
following observation stated in the paper. “Although effective bidder collusion 
will produce winning bids that are low relative to the predictions of a suitable 
model of non-cooperative behavior, it clearly would not be reasonable to 
conclude that bidders are colluding solely on the basis of the observation of 
relatively low winning bids”. Accordingly, five models are estimated: the non-
cooperative model with no supply effects, the collusive model with no supply 
effects, the non-cooperative model with supply effects and two nested models 
that contain both collusion and supply effects. 
I concentrate here on the collusive model with unit supply. The underlying 
theoretical model that leads to the empirical model is based on Graham and 
Marshall’s (1987) collusive mechanism. In this pre-auction knockout, 
colluding bidders find participation individually rational. The effective 
coalition size is denoted by   . Conditional on   , the price of the object is 
given by the    + 1st order statistic of the private values. Two important 
assumptions behind the model are that bidder collusion is a (symmetric) 
bidder-specific decision and that there is only one coalition. Thus all non-ring 
bidders act non-cooperatively. Another important element of the model is the 
probability of joining the coalition,   .  Conditional on       the natural 
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logarithm of private values is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
     and variance  
 , where    is a vector of covariates. The standardized 
price,                
      , is a mixed random variable with       
      
   and density     |   , where    is the winning bid at auction  ,    is 
the volume in mbf and                
      , with    denoting the reserve 
price.
22
 The authors specify the likelihood of the collusive model as well as a 
parametric expression for   . Let    be the coalition participating at auction   
and                        
      . The likelihood function is 
 
 
 
where          denotes the total number of observations.    is the set 
containing 13 observations in which the winning bid is within 5.5% of the 
reserve price, the remaining observations belong to   .
23
   is a parameter from 
the expression for    and   denotes the data set. 
The model is estimated using standard ML techniques. The main 
conclusion from this analysis is that the collusive model outperforms the non-
cooperative model. Moreover, the authors highlight that both models pass the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Thus, log-normality is not rejected. This leads the 
authors to the further conclusion that the increase in the log likelihood function 
observed in the collusive case is not due to misspecification of the private 
value distribution. With respect to the model containing supply effects and the 
nesting models, the authors conclude that as soon as collusion is taken into 
account, supply does not add explanatory power. Overall, the collusive model 
emerges as the preferred model. 
More recently Aryal and Gabrielli (2013) propose a two-step procedure to 
detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement (auctions). First, they 
use a reduced form test to short-list bidders whose bidding behavior is at-odds 
with competitive bidding; and Second, they estimate the (latent) cost for these 
                                                          
22 In their paper Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) provide the explicit forms for the 
density and cumulative distribution functions of   . 
23 The13 observations in the set    are considered as outliers. However, Baldwin, Marshall, and 
Richard (1997) argue that it would be inappropriate to discard them from the estimation. See 
section VI.C and Appendix D of that paper for a detailed discussion. 
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bidders under both competition and collusion setups. Since, for the same bid 
the recovered cost must be smaller under collusion- as collusion increases the 
mark-up- than under competition, detecting collusion boils down to testing for 
first-order stochastic dominance, for which we the authors use the classic 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. The paper also 
presents Bootstrap based Monte Carlo experiments for asymmetric bidders that 
confirm that the procedure has good power to detect collusion when there is 
collusion. The authors illustrate the procedure by implementing the tests for 
Highway Procurement data in California and conclude that there is no 
evidence of collusion even though the reduced form test supports collusion. 
This highlights potential pitfalls of inferring collusion based only on reduced 
form analysis. 
About how collusion is sustained, Aryal and Gabrielli (2013) assume that 
the bidding ring can control the bids of the members and can eliminate all ring 
competition and hence there is only one serious bidder, the most efficient 
bidder, i.e. there is efficient collusion. This is the most favorable environment 
for collusion and for the purpose of the paper it is not necessary to spell out the 
exact rules of sharing the surplus.
24
  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This paper is an attempt to survey the state of the art regarding First-Price 
Auction Theory as well as the Econometric Methods mainly used to estimate 
the theoretical models. The reason for focusing on sealed bid first price auction 
mechanisms is that most of the data sets available for empirical research come 
from this auction type. The central aspect of the paper is the so-called 
Structural Approach to analyze auction data. This approach is closely related 
to the underlying game theoretic model. Given the tight relation between the 
theoretic model and the corresponding econometric model I start by reviewing 
the different paradigms developed in the literature to model auctions. In this 
respect section 2 contains a description of the Private Value Paradigm and the 
Common Value Paradigm to model auctions, which can be further classified 
into symmetric and asymmetric models, and independent and affiliated 
models. All of these lead to different auction models. After characterizing each 
                                                          
24  Marshall and Marx (2007) show that only in the first-price auction, if the ring cannot control 
the bids then the equilibrium entails multiple bids and the model need not be identified. 
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model and in particular how the Bayesian Nash equilibrium looks like in each 
case I have described the most important results concerning the identification 
issue. This key aspect is what then allows the researcher to propose a 
Structural Econometric Model. Section 3 then describes extensively the 
structural approach, which distinguishes two kinds of methods: direct methods 
and indirect procedures. Among direct methods, which were first developed in 
the literature, there are maximum-likelihood based procedures and simulation-
based procedures. The last ones are more attractive from a computational point 
of view because they do not need to solve explicitly for the equilibrium of of 
the model, something that could be highly computationally demanding or even 
impossible in some cases. Later, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) 
introduced the use of indirect methods which rely on a very simple buy key 
observation, namely the relation between the bid distribution $G(.)$ and the 
private value distribution      through the strictly increasing equilibrium 
strategy. This observation allows identification and leads to a natural two-step 
procedure. 
Given the nonparametric nature of indirect procedures, I have devoted a 
section to explain the use of kernel methods and local polynomials for 
estimating auction models.  
Finally, given that one source of asymmetries that constitute a pervasive 
problem within auction markets is collusion this survey has also a section that 
presents the most relevant literature (theoretical and applied) on collusion.  
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